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Maintaining the Legal Fiction: Application of the
Presumption of Paternity and Paternity by Estoppel
in Pennsylvania
I. OVERVIEW
Questions surrounding the paternity of a child have a devastat-
ing emotional, as well as legal, impact on the child, the mother,
the putative father, and the biological father.' Deoxyribonucleic
Acid (DNA) testing, as well as other forms of blood testing, have
made determining the identity of the biological father highly accu-
rate. However, courts are reluctant to admit these blood tests into
evidence due to the existence of the presumption of paternity.2 As
one author has noted, "[i]n the eyes of the law, a man can be de-
termined the legal father of the child even though blood tests con-
clusively show that the man could not have possibly fathered the
child."3
Pennsylvania law requires that a two-part test be satisfied be-
fore blood test results are admitted as evidence of paternity. The
first step is to determine whether the presumption of paternity
applies, and the second step is to determine whether paternity by
estoppel can be invoked.4 The presumption of paternity stands for
the principle that "a child conceived or born during the marriage
is presumed to be the child of the marriage." The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court maintains that the presumption of paternity is
"one of the strongest presumptions of the law of Pennsylvania."
However, if there is no longer an intact marriage to protect, this
presumption becomes rebuttable.6
Paternity by estoppel is the legal theory that "because of a per-
son's conduct . . . that person, regardless of his true biological
1. Jeffrey A. Parness, Old-Fashioned Pregnancy, Newly-Fashioned Paternity, 53
SYRACUSE L. REV. 57, 59-60 (2003).
2. Brie S. Rogers, The Presumption of Paternity in Child Support Cases: A Triumph of
Law over Biology, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1151 (2002).
3. Heather Faust, Challenging the Paternity of Children Born During Wedlock: An
Analysis of Pennsylvania Law Regarding the Effects of the Doctrines of Presumption of
Legitimacy and Paternity by Estoppel on the Admissibility of Blood Tests to Determine Pa-
ternity, 100 DICK. L. REv. 963, 986 (1996).
4. J.C. v. J.S., 826 A-2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
5. Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179 (Pa. 1997) (plurality opinion).
6. Brinkley, 701 A-2d at 179.
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status, will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor will the child's
mother who has participated in this conduct be permitted to sue a
third party for support, claiming that the third party is the true
father."
The most recent development in this area of Pennsylvania law
is permitting the presumed father to "preclude the application of
paternity by estoppel" when there is evidence of fraud or misrep-
resentation on behalf of the person attempting to invoke the doc-
trine even though, for some time, he has held the child out as his
8own.
The presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel have
been highly criticized as being an antiquated system for establish-
ing paternity. The majority opinion in Brinkley v. King,9 written
by Chief Justice Flaherty, upheld these two doctrines, but stated:
The presumption of paternity and the doctrine of estoppel,
therefore, embody the two great fictions of the law of pater-
nity: the presumption of paternity embodies the fiction that
regardless of biology, the married people to whom the child
was born are the parents; and the doctrine of estoppel embod-
ies the fiction that, regardless of biology, in the absence of a
marriage, the person who has cared for the child is the par-
ent.'l
As one author noted, a "glaring difference exists between the doc-
trines of paternity and equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel
generally is used to punish the party who made the misrepresen-
tation. However, in certain situations, paternity estoppel can ac-
tually penalize the victim of the misrepresentation."1
Using these legal theories before considering the results of ge-
netic testing, on the surface, seems illogical because one would
assume that the biological father would have a natural right to
support, visit and care for his issue. However, after considering
the policy behind these rules, Pennsylvania seems to have found a
workable rule. As will be discussed in this comment, Pennsyl-
vania law preserves the functioning marital unit, precludes the
presumed father from denying paternity when he has held the
7. J.C., 826 A.2d at 3-4.
8. Id. at 4.
9. 701 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1997) (plurality opinion).
10. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180.




child out as his own and knew or had a reason to know the true
paternity of the child, and allows the presumed father relief if the
mother used fraud or misrepresentation with respect to the true
paternity of the child.
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY
A. Origin of the Presumption of Paternity and the Supporting
Public Policy
The presumption of paternity originated in the common law of
England in the sixteenth century in order to "protect children from
the hardship of being defined as 'illegitimate,'" and "to preserve
the traditional model of family."12 At that time in England, declar-
ing a child to be illegitimate meant that the child was subjected to
"serious legal and social discrimination" and was "the heir of no
one and unable to create heirs."3
In today's society, the stigma associated with being an "illegiti-
mate" child has become insignificant. "In Pennsylvania, the Gen-
eral Assembly has eliminated the legal distinction (and discrimi-
nation) between 'illegitimate' and 'legitimate' children."'
Preservation of the family unit and an intact marriage contin-
ues to be of the utmost importance and worthy of protection. 5
Chief Justice Flaherty, in Brinkley, stated:
The public policy in support of the presumption of paternity is
the concern that marriages which function as family units
should not be destroyed by disputes over the parentage of
children conceived or born during the marriage. Third parties
should not be allowed to attack the integrity of a functioning
12. Rogers, supra note 2, at 1152-53.
13. Id.
14. Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). The Superior
Court stated:
The general assembly has declared all children to be legitimate:
All children shall be legitimate irrespective of the marital status of their par-
ents, and in every case where children are born out of wedlock, they shall enjoy
all the rights and privileges as if they had been born during the wedlock of
their parents except as otherwise provided in Title 20 (relating to decedents,
estates and fiduciaries).
Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 728 (quoting 23 PA. CONS. SI'AT. §5102(a) (1990)).
15. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989).
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marital unit, and members of that unit should not be allowed
to deny their identities as parents.16
The continued vitality of the policy behind the presumption was
questioned in Brinkley because in modern society "separation, di-
vorce, and children born during marriage to third party fathers is
relatively common," thus negating the sole purpose for maintain-
ing the presumption of paternity." However, in those situations
where the marital unit is intact and functioning, the Court has
reasoned that it is necessary to continue to apply the presump-
tion."
The argument can be made that when challenges to the pater-
nity of children born during wedlock arise, the marriage is in
trouble and likely to end. Therefore, maintaining a policy that
protects the marital unit is an exercise in futility. However, if the
married couple chooses to continue their marriage and work
through their problems, a third party should not be permitted to
attack the institution. The preservation of the marital unit in that
case is a worthy endeavor, and courts should do their best to pro-
tect it.
B. Application of the Presumption of Paternity
Traditionally, the only fact necessary to apply the presumption
of paternity was that a child was born when the couple was mar-
ried. 9 Once this occurred, the presumption could only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence that the husband did not have
access to his wife during the time of conception or that the hus-
band was not able to reproduce (i.e. impotence or sterilization).2 °
16. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180.
17. Id. at 181.
18. Id. Justice Zappala filed a concurring opinion, wherein he disagreed only with the
majority's definition of non-access. Id. at 181 (Zappala, J., concurring). It should be noted
that Justice Nigro disagreed with the majority's rationale and stated the following:
I am unable to join in this approach because I believe that both the presumption of
paternity and paternity by estoppel should no longer be strictly applied, as they have
been in the past. In light of the changed, and increasingly fluid, nature of the family,
and the increased rates of divorce and separation, these legal fictions have become
less reflective of social reality.
Id. at 182 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Newman filed a dissenting and
concurring opinion, in which Justice Castille joined, wherein it was stated that "the pre-
sumption that a child born during coverture is a child of the marriage has lost its place in
modern society, especially considering the scientific testing available both to prove and to
disprove paternity." Id. at 185 (Newman, J., dissenting).




The presumption of paternity is irrebuttable "when a third party
seeks to assert his own paternity as against the husband in an
,,21intact marriage.
In 1997, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Miscovich v. Mis-
covich,22 found that the husband did not present sufficient evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of paternity and DNA evidence
was not admissible to rebut that presumption. 23 The facts of this
case are as follows: two years after husband and wife had di-
vorced, husband began to question the paternity of his son.24 After
DNA testing determined that his son was not his biological son, he
cut off all ties with the child, and the mother filed an action in
support." The Superior Court acknowledged that, in some situa-
tions, the presumption did not apply when there was not an intact
marriage to preserve. However, the court focused on the fact that
there was a child born during wedlock to trigger the presumption
of paternity. 6 Since the presumption automatically applies, and
there was no evidence presented to prove inability or inaccess, the
court concluded that the presumption had not been rebutted and
the husband was legally the father of the child, irrespective of the
fact that DNA testing proved otherwise.
However, courts have held that the presumption of paternity did
not to apply in situations where the parties had separated and
obtained a decree in divorce because the public policy behind the
presumption (i.e. preservation of the marital unit) was no longer
applicable." In Barnard v. Anderson,29 the putative father and
biological mother had three children before the putative father
had a vasectomy." Three years later, mother became pregnant,
and five months after the child's birth, the parties separated.'
Based on this factual situation, the Superior Court held that the
21. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 179 (citing John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1388-89 (Pa.
1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990)).
22. 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
23. Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 727. It should be noted that this opinion was published
after the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted its version of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §5104 (1990).
24. Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 727.
25. Id. at 727-28.
26. Id. at 728-29.
27. Id. at 733.
28. Barnard v. Anderson, 767 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (citing Sekol v. Del-
santro, 763 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)).
29. 767 A.2d 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).




presumption of paternity did not apply because "the very purpose
for application of the presumption, preservation of the marriage,
has been thwarted and is no longer relevant, for the parties were
divorced before the hearing of this matter."
3 2
III. PATERNITY BY ESTOPPEL
A. Origins and History of Paternity by Estoppel
Estoppel is "a doctrine of fundamental fairness designed to pre-
clude a party from depriving another of a reasonable expectation
when the party inducing the expectation albeit gratuitously knew
or should have known that the other would rely upon that conduct
to his or her detriment."33 In the realm of paternity law, estoppel
is "applied to prevent a presumptive father (the husband), or the
natural mother (the wife), from denying the husband's paternity if
the couple has resided together as husband and wife and the hus-
band held the child out as his own." Consistent with the doctrine
of estoppel, if the presumptive father is induced to believe that he
is the biological father by fraud or misrepresentation on the part
of the mother, the presumptive father is not estopped from deny-
ing paternity of the child as long as when the fraud is revealed, he
ceases to have contact with the child.
B. Application of Paternity by Estoppel
The doctrine of paternity by estoppel is used most frequently to
prevent a putative father from denying paternity, but it also has
been used to prevent a person from claiming paternity." In J. C. v.
J.S.," the Pennsylvania Superior Court used the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel to prevent the putative father from denying pater-
nity.37 In J.C., mother and father were married, and approxi-
mately six months prior to the birth of their first child, father be-
32. Id. at 595. The court further noted that another significant fact in this case was
that mother and biological father had married and wished to raise the child "within that
nuclear family." Id. Additionally, this case was remanded to the trial court because in
holding that the presumption of paternity applied, the trial court did not make a sufficient
finding to warrant an appellate decision on the application of paternity by estoppel. Id. at
595-96.
33. Faust, supra note 3, at 979 (internal quotations omitted).
34. Id.
35. Cotter, supra note 11, at 24.
36. 826 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
37. J.C., 826 A-2d at 1.
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came aware that mother had had an extramarital affair." Follow-
ing a brief separation, the parties resumed their regular marital
relationship in 1989 and maintained that relationship until 1996
when they obtained a final decree in divorce.39 In 1997, father
learned that the child was not his biological son; however, he con-
tinued to hold the child out as his own.4° It was not until 2001
that father petitioned the trial court to order blood tests to estab-
lish paternity.4'
Upon these facts, the Superior Court determined that since fa-
ther held child out as his own after learning the child was not his,
he was required to support that child.4' The Court recognized that
even though proof of fraud is sufficient to prevent application of
paternity by estoppel, unless the putative father ceases contact
with the child upon learning that he is not the biological father, he
will be forced to support that child.43
Where fraud is used to induce the putative father into holding
the child out as his own, the Superior Court has held that he is not
estopped from denying paternity.4 In Kohler v. Bleem,45 the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court prohibited the biological father from us-
ing paternity by estoppel against the putative father who was at-
tempting to deny paternity.46 In Kohler, the mother of the child
had an affair with a neighbor and became pregnant, but she told
her husband that it was an "unknown" man that had fathered the
child. 7 Based on this information, the father took responsibility
for the child until he learned years later the actual identity of the
biological father.48 Upon learning the true identity of the child's
biological father, the husband left the marital residence and dis-
continued contact with the child.49 When the mother filed for sup-
port against the biological father, the biological father attempted
to estop the husband from denying paternity, but the Superior
Court stated that since the putative father terminated contact
38. Id. at 2 (citing J.C. v. J.S., No. F.D. 95-010897, slip op. at 2 (Pa. D. & C. 2002)).




43. Id. at 4-5.
44. Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
45. 654 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).






with the children when he found out about the fraud perpetrated
by mother, estoppel did not apply. 0
C. Public Policy Supporting Paternity by Estoppel
According to David Cotter, "[t]he guiding paternity-estoppel
principle is the law's preference for family relationships over biol-
ogy." 5' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
Estoppel is based on the public policy that children should be
secure in knowing who their parents are. If a certain person
has acted as the parent and bonded with the child, the child
should not be required to suffer the potentially damaging
trauma that may come from being told that the father he has
known all his life is not in fact his father.52
Even though the determination of whether estoppel applies is very
fact-specific, the policy behind the doctrine must be considered in
any estoppel analysis.53
In Ruth F. v. Robert B.,' the Superior Court applied paternity
by estoppel to prevent a mother from denying the paternity of her
former husband.55 In Ruth F., the father had knowledge that the
child was not his child, but he continued to hold the child out as
his own." As such, the court held that it would be contrary to the
policy behind estoppel to force the child to begin a relationship
with a man that he does not know and stop a relationship with a
man that he always believed was his father. 7
IV. MECHANICS OF THE BLOOD TEST
In most cases where the presumption of paternity and paternity
by estoppel arise, the parties are seeking to admit blood test re-
sults either confirming or denying one's paternity. The blood tests
sought to be used are usually DNA tests, although there are other
tests available. 8 DNA testing is premised on the theory of genetic
50. Id.
51. Cotter, supra note 11, at 23.
52. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180.
53. J.C., 826 A.2d at 6.
54. 690 A.2d 1171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
55. Ruth F., 690 A-2d at 1171.
56. Id. at 1175-76.
57. Id.
58. Faust, supra note 3, at 966-67.
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fingerprinting-every human being has a unique genetic code.59
Paternity can be nearly conclusively established through this type
of testing based on the "extent to which an alleged father and the
child in question actually share the same DNA." 0 Thus, "if a
child's blood contains a particular component that is not found in
the mother's blood, that component must be found in the alleged
father's blood, or that person is not the natural father."1
The procedure for DNA testing is as follows: first, all three par-
ties (the child, the mother, and the putative father) submit sam-
ples of blood to the laboratory technician; next, the laboratory
technician "extracts the DNA from the tissue sample and divides
the DNA into smaller segments;" finally, these smaller segments
produce a "visual image... much like a fingerprint. 12 When the
fingerprints of the putative father and mother are compared with
the child, it is possible to determine whether the putative father is
actually the biological father of the child. In most cases, this DNA
paternity conclusion is not relevant to the legal issue of paternity,
due to the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM ACT ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETER-
MINE PATERNITY
The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the "Uniform Act on
Blood Tests to Determine Paternity" ("the Uniform Act" or "the
Act") to regulate the admissibility of blood tests to determine pa-
ternity.63 This legislation provides that courts may order blood
tests in any matter in which paternity of a child is a "relevant
fact."64 In the Uniform Act, the legislature specifically addressed
the effect on the presumption of paternity:
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock
is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the
59. Id.
60. Id. at 967.
61. Id. at 966.
62. Id. at 967 (citing Anthony Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined Witness, 77
CAL. L. REv. 665 (1989)).
63. 23 PA.CONS. STAT. § 5104 (1990).
64. Id. at § 5104(c). The text of this section provides:
In any matter subject to this section in which paternity, parentage or identity of a
child is a relevant fact, the court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by
or on behalf of any person whose blood is involved, may or, upon motion of any party
to the action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly shall order the
mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests.
Id. at § 5104(c).
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experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests
show that the husband is not the father of the child.65
When courts have interpreted the language of the Uniform Act,
they have consistently stated that blood tests are not relevant
unless the presumption of paternity has been rebutted.66 In
McCue v. McCue,67 the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that
"[t]he necessity to follow the common law requirement of proving
non-access or impotence has not been eliminated by enactment of
the blood test act."6" It was further recognized that "[t]he Act does
not relax the presumption that a child born to a marriage is a
'child of the marriage;' it merely provides a mechanism through
which an alleged father can accumulate evidence of paternity."69
In the area of paternity by estoppel, the McCue court stated,
"blood tests may well be irrelevant, for the law will not permit a
person in these situations to challenge the status which he or she
has previously accepted." °
Again, in 1997, the Superior Court, in Miscovich, discussed the
relationship between the Act and the presumption of paternity.
7 1
The court reasoned that the issue of paternity, and therefore blood
tests, does not become relevant until sufficient evidence is pre-
sented to rebut the presumption2.7 As a result, "[w]ith respect to a
child born during wedlock, if the presumption of paternity has not
been rebutted with clear and convincing evidence, as the trial
court determined in this case, blood tests may not be ordered."73
President Judge Emeritus Cirillo, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that blood tests may be ordered "if the presumption of pa-
ternity has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence" be-
cause at that point "paternity becomes a relevant fact."
74
VI. CONCLUSION
Using the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel to
make blood tests irrelevant for purposes of determining paternity
65. Id. at § 5104(g).
66. McCue v. McCue, 604 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
67. 604 A.2d 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
68. McCue, 604 A.2d at 741 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 742 (citing John M., 571 A.2d at 1380).
70. McCue, 604 A-2d at 741 (emphasis in original).
71. Miscovich, 688 Ak2d at 729-30.
72. Id.




has several beneficial effects. First, it permits a husband and wife
to attempt to work through their difficulties in order to salvage a
marriage that may be in trouble. Second, it requires adults who
have created a bond with the child to maintain that bond in order
to prevent the child from suffering extreme emotional hardship.
The policies that underlie these doctrines are significant and wor-
thy of protection.75
However, these legal fictions often punish the innocent spouse
or party by forcing him to continue to support a child that is not
his. Under the current state of paternity law, the only available
remedy to the presumed father is to cease all contact with the
child as soon as he learns of the possibility that the child may not
be his.7' Although this option creates extreme emotional difficulty
for the innocent child and spouse, to allow a man to maintain a
parental relationship with a child, but to not have to support that
child, could be equally damaging. Additionally, in situations
where all three adult parties agree upon the identity of the bio-
logical father, and the biological father is ready, willing, and able
to support the child, these legal fictions could prevent him from
assuming that responsibility.
It appears that the Pennsylvania Legislature attempted to
make blood test evidence relevant, and therefore admissible, in
any situation where the paternity of a child is in dispute, but the
Uniform Act only addressed the significance attached to the blood
test once it had been admitted into evidence, it did not directly
address the admissibility of these results. 7  The courts that have
addressed this issue have concluded that the language contained
in the Uniform Act means that blood test evidence is admissible to
prove paternity only when the presumption of paternity and pa-
ternity by estoppel have been overcome.78 This conclusion that the
presumption of paternity must be overcome by the traditional test
before a court will look at the results of a DNA test is sound.
If there is to be any change in the way the presumption of pa-
ternity and paternity by estoppel are applied, the change should
be made in the legislature, not the courts. The method outlined in
case law seems to be a fair and workable standard. However,
courts should be permitted to admit evidence of blood tests on a
75. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., J.C., 826 A.2d at 4-5.
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Spring 2004 587
588 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 42
case-by-case basis when the principles of equity would be offended
by its omission.
Jacqulyn A. West
